Wally with a Brolly

In recent years, it has been seen as 'European' to drop the second striker to midfielder, as if naming your formation as 4-2-3-1 automatically makes you a more sophisticated team. This led to a period where we saw a number of dour, disappointing games involving two packed midfields and teams playing not to lose. So far however, Euro 2012 has surprised us all with very open and attacking matches. So why have two of the cagiest matches involved the two teams that most people cast as favourites, Spain and Germany?

One reason for this could be the level of respect showed to both teams. Portugal recognised the force they were up against, playing a defensive 4-5-1, with Veloso sitting just in front of the back four to negate German playmaker Mesut Özil, whilst Italy manager Cesare Prandelli showed his tactical nous by adopting a 3-5-2 formation to stifle the Spanish threat. In the last few days, much has been said about how Roy Hodgson has got the best out of the players available to him, but even he could learn from the way Prandelli used his players to his advantage.

So, let’s start with Germany. One of the most attractive teams at the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, this is a team packed with quality and pace, whilst retaining that strong core and work ethic that makes them so difficult to beat. In reality however, their tactics are relatively straightforward, with each player having strict roles. Boateng, Hummels and Badstuber are predominantly defensive players, with the sole interest of winning and retaining the ball, with Khedira and Schweinsteiger constantly attacking or defending selflessly as need be, whilst Lahm (bombing from full-back), Müller, Podolski, Özil and Gomez providing the attacking threat, showing quick interchanges, with the three attacking midfielders probing as much as possible to find that yard of space.

However, to an extent Germany have been victims of their own success. In 2010, they played in a way that surprised many people, and soaked up pressure before pouncing: overloading one flank, with the result that the centre backs moved across, leaving space for the cross-field ball to Podolski/Müller (see England’s 1-4 lesson in South Africa for examples). Now that the world knows what they are capable of, defences sit deeper, and don’t tend to play too recklessly. Portugal have hardly been the most expressive of sides in recent years (a shame given the talent they have), but their dogged approach is likely to be what the Germans are faced with. Consequently, Joachim Löw’s team had to stay patient and carve out their openings in a fashion more synonymous with the tournament holders, Spain, before Gomez finally made their pressure count.

This brings us neatly onto the favourites, who suffered a huge blow pre-tournament with the loss of David Villa. The tiki-taka style is now well-renowned with the successes of this team and Barcelona, and there is no doubt that it can be great to watch, but it is very hard to pull off without a focal point. Del Bosque’s decision not to field a recognised striker was therefore odd to say the least. Sure, Barcelona play a false nine… but then Barcelona have Messi. There are many good things to be said of Cesc Fabregas, but neither he nor David Silva are strikers and defences will know that they can sit back and watch play unfold in front of them.

The well-noted problem with Spain’s performance was a lack of two things: a striker, and width. The passing is all well and good, but as long as you can keep it in front of you, it’s not particularly dangerous. The Spanish looked so much better with Torres on the pitch - sure, he’s not firing by any means, but he got in the positions they needed and gave Spain’s 5 or 6 playmakers someone to pass to.

And so we reach the best team, tactically, of the tournament so far. Italy did exactly what they had to do, and could certainly consider themselves unlucky not to have been 2-0 up before Torres’ late chances. The decision to play 3 centre backs worked well, with the Italians soaking up the pressure, whilst Marchisio and Thiago Motta stifled the play in midfield. The man with the metronome, Andrea Pirlo, did what he always does, finding the right pass, and he was helped by actually having two outlets in Cassano and Balotelli, who tested their Spanish counterparts with their pace and movement. Finally, we also saw the wingbacks keeping the Spanish full-backs Alba and Arbeloa occupied, ensuring that there was no way for the Spanish to get the width they needed. Everyone had their role and knew exactly what they were doing. Sure, it wasn’t necessarily pretty, but they adapted to counter their opposition, and bar one magical pass from Silva, Spain had no answer. Does anyone see the Italians adopting 4-2-3-1 any time soon?